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Abstract: 
This paper presents an agent-based model of passenger rail services. It provides an 
algorithm that is able to find the optimal price and timetable for a service provided by 
a monopoly train operating company. For testing the efficiency of the algorithm, it 
presents a simplified setting in which the equilibrium price and timetable can be found 
analytically using the Salop model of competition. The paper finds that the algorithm 
approximates well the predicted price and timetable and that an increase in the 
equilibrium number of trains in the market reduces the efficiency of the algorithm. 
 
Introduction  
An overwhelming majority of long-distance passenger rail services in Europe are 
provided by state-owned monopolies. In a handful of cases, mainly in Sweden, Great 
Britain, and Germany, long-distance connections are served by private monopoly 
franchisees. The instances in which two or more train companies operate on the same 
track are rare. In most of these markets, including several markets in Germany and 
Great Britain and a few tracks in other European countries, the entry occurred thanks to 
the open-access regulation. The rest are British connections with competition between 
two franchisees operating mainly on the routes between London and regional centers. 
 
One of the reasons why authorities do not support the introduction of competition on 
long-distance connections might be the insufficient understanding of the impact of such 
policies on consumer welfare. The effect of competition on consumer is also difficult to 
study empirically as the number of instances of competition is limited and it is difficult 
to collect relevant data. Hence a potentially useful way to study competition for and in 
railway markets is a model simulation. 
 
Transportation economics focused mainly on development of route based models in 
which the effect of specific pricing strategies or timetables is studied. The most 
prominent examples of these models are the PRAISE model developed at the 
Institute for Transport Studies of the University of Leeds ([1], [4], [8]) and the model 
presented by Steer Davies Gleave [7] in the report prepared for the European 
Commission. These models do not find the equilibrium outcomes of competition. 
Instead, they study the effect of specific changes in prices and timetable on profits of 
train companies and consumer welfare using calibrated demand and supply. 
 
For finding the equilibrium price and timetable in a railway market, this paper uses an 
agent-based technology (see [2] and [3] for different agent-based models of markets). 
The algorithm presented here is the first step towards an equilibrium model of rail 
passenger market. It presents an algorithm that can be used for finding the equilibrium 
price and departure times of trains. The algorithm is tested in a simplified setting with 
uniformly distributed passengers in which the equilibrium price and timetable can be 
found analytically using the Salop model of circular city ([5]).  
 
The paper is organized in the following way. Section 1 introduces the model of 
a passenger rail market. Section 2 presents the results of simulations and compares them 
to the analytical solution of the model. Finally, the last section concludes. 
 
1. Description of the model 
This section presents a model of a passenger rail service implemented in the modeling 
environment Netlogo 5.0.4. Each simulation of the model approximates the equilibrium 
price and timetable in the market. In each simulation, the model is first initialized and 
then moves through a number of periods. This section will describe the model in the 
order in which the simulation evolves. 
 
The initialized model contains the landscape (world), passengers and an initial set of 
train connections of a monopoly train operator. The world is a line with a length equal 
to 240 patches (a patch in Netlogo is a square field which side can be used as a measure 
of distance). The line represents 24 hours at a railway station in a departure city. 
Furthermore, the world wraps at both ends, so that the line can be viewed more 
accurately as a circle with the circumference of 240 patches and interpreted as 24 hours 
at a station in a sequence of identical days (e.g. a working day in the middle of the 
weak). The world is populated by g identical passengers who are uniformly distributed 
along the line. Passengers have reservation price pr which is the maximum price they 
are willing to pay for a train ticket to the destination city. Finally, the model creates nI 
initial train connections where nI equals to the equilibrium number of firms nE minus 
a constant λ. Each train is assigned an initial price p0 and a random location in the 
landscape l0 ∈ [0,240). 
 
The initialization is followed by a certain number of periods which can be divided in 
three phases: The first price-adjusting phase takes up the first TP periods. In this phase, 
the model adjusts the ticket price given the initial number of trains and timetable. The 
price-adjusting phase is supposed to eliminate the potential effect of the arbitrarily set 
initial price on simulation results. In the second phase, the model adjusts both the ticket 
price and timetable for a given number of train connections. The second phase lasts for 
TS periods. The third phase, called the entry phase, consists of entry cycles. Each entry 
cycle has a length of E periods. The total number of entry cycles is determined in the 
course of the simulation.  
 
The actions of the agents in a given period may be divided in two steps: 1) entry and 
reset and 2) adjusting price and timetables. First, I explain how the price and departure 
times are adjusted. In the price-setting phase, all trains may keep the current price or 
increase or reduce the price by a constant εt which is drawn out of a uniform distribution 
between 0 and εmax in every period. Hence in each period t ≤ TP, the monopoly train 
operator chooses the price pt + εt, pt – εt or pt in order to maximize its profit Πt which is 
equal to the sum of profits of all its trains πit = ptqit/g – F, where qit is the number of 
passengers on the train, g is the total number of passengers, and F is the fixed cost of 
the train. I divide the train’s revenue by g in order to normalize total number of 
passengers to one, so that the structure of the agent-based model corresponds to the 
Salop model with passengers uniformly distributed on a unit circle. The choice of train i 
by passenger j depends on the reservation price pr, ticket price in period t pt, waiting 
time in hours hijt, and per-hour weighting cost w > 0. Passenger j chooses the train with 
the lowest pt + whijt
2 if pr > pt + whijt
2, and no train otherwise. 
 
In each period of the second and third phase, the train operating companies adjust the 
price and timetable at the same time. The individual trains consider leaving the 
departure time unchanged or changing it by a time step st in both directions. In each 
period t > TP, the time step st is drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 and 
240/(nEτ), where nE is the equilibrium number of trains and τ is a constant determining 
the maximum size of the time step. In the adjustment process in each period t > TP, the 
train operator creates a random order of all its trains. In this order, each train chooses 
the price and departure time out of the nine possible combinations of prices pt, pt + εt, pt 
– εt and departure times lt, lt + st, lt – st which maximizes its profit. It means that the 
price may change nt times in period t, where nt is the total number of train connections. 
If the profits in two or more alternatives are equal, the trains choose the departure time 
and price according to the following preference ordering: lt + st, pt + εt; lt + st, pt – εt; lt + 
st, pt; lt – st, pt + εt; lt – st, pt – εt; lt – st, pt; lt, pt + εt; lt, pt – εt; lt, pt. E.g. if the profits for lt 
+ st, pt – εt and lt + st, pt are equal and the profit for lt + st, pt + εt  is lower and the profits 
for the remaining elements of the preference ordering are lower or equal, the train 
company increases the departure time and reduces the price (lt + st, pt – εt). 
 
Entry and reset occur only in the entry phase. A new train connection is created in the 
first periods of each entry cycle, i.e. in periods t = {TP + Ts + 1, TP + Ts + E + 1, TP + Ts 
+ 2E + 1,…}. The new train is assigned a random location lt ∈ [0,240) and the price 
charged in the previous period pt–1. In the last period of each entry cycle, the profit of 
the operator is compared with the profit E periods back (in the last period before the 
latest entry). If the current profit is lower (Πt < Πt–E), the number of trains, their 
location, and the price from period t – E is reset. The simulation ends when the entry 
fails to increase the profit (i.e. when Πt < Πt–E) in c entry cycles in a row.  
2. Results 
In this section, I compare the results of the simulations with the solution of the model. 
This allows us to evaluate the overall efficiency of the model algorithm and the impact 
of different settings of the algorithm on its efficiency. 
 
The structure of the model resembles the Salop model with passengers uniformly 
distributed on a circle with a unit circumference served by a monopoly train operator 
with n trains (see [6] for a detailed description and the solution of the theoretical 
model). The profit-maximizing monopoly distributes the trains on the circle so that the 
distances between all the trains are identical and all passengers are served by the 
operator. The equilibrium number of trains is  
,
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where w is the waiting cost and F the fixed cost. The equilibrium price in the market is 
given by pE = pR – w/(2nE)
2, where pR is the reservation price. The profit of the operator 
is the difference between its total revenue, which is equal to price as the equilibrium 
quantity qE = 1, and fixed costs of all plants πE = pE – nEF. 
 
The algorithm needs some time to converge to the equilibrium price and timetable. 
Sufficient length of the first two phases and of the entry cycle seems to be 100 periods 
(TP = TS = E = 100). The remaining parameter values are set as follows: the number of 
passengers g = 1,000; the reservation price pr = 1; the initial price p0 = 0.5; the fixed 
cost F = {0.01, 0.02}; the equilibrium number of trains nE = {5, 10, 15, 20}; the per-
hour weighting cost is set so that the equation (1) holds, i.e. w = 2FnE
3; the initial 
number of trains is nI = nE – λ, where λ = 3; the maximum price step εmax = {0.005, 
0.01}; the maximum departure-time step is smax = 240/(τnE), where nE is the equilibrium 
number of trains and the time-step constant is τ = {6, 12}; and the number of resets in 
a row that ends the simulation c = 2. Furthermore, I run 4 random initializations of the 
model for each setting of the model using random seeds 1, 2, 3, and 4 (see the random-
seed function of Netlogo 5.0.4). Hence the total number of simulations is S = 128. 
 
At the end of each simulation, I measure the number of trains N, profit Π, price P, and 
quantity Q. The values of the variables generated in the simulations were close to the 
predicted values. The mean (standard deviation) of the difference between the simulated 
and predicted number of trains N – nE equals –0.047 (0.47), of the difference in profits 
Π – πE is –1.58 10
–3 (1.2 10–3), of the difference between prices P – pE is –1.69 10
–3 
(7.22 10–3), and of the difference in quantities Q – qE equals to –0.44 10
–3 (1.23 10–3). 
 
TAB. 1: OLS estimation 
Dependent variable: Profit difference (Π – πE) 
 
 coefficient standard error p-value 
constant –0.0007 0.0004 0.11 
fixed cost (F) 0.011 0.015 0.46 
maximum price step (εmax) –0.04 0.03 0.18 
time-step constant (τ) 5.45e–05 2.49e–05 0.03 
equilibrium no. of trains (nE) –9.87e–05 1.34e–05 1.98e–11 
S = 128             Adj. R2 = 0.33           ln L = 726.6 
 
Using the difference between simulated and predicted profits Π – πE as a measure of the 
efficiency of the algorithm, I regressed Π – πE against all exogenous variables of the 
model changed in the simulations (except for the random seed). Table 1 shows that 
a change in the fixed cost has no statistically significant effect, a reduction in the 
maximum-price step εmax and the departure-time step smax (a rise in the time-step 
constant τ) tends to increase the efficiency of the algorithm, although only a change in τ 
is marginally statistically significant, and a rise in the equilibrium number of trains nE 
statistically significantly reduces the efficiency of the algorithm.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper presents an agent-based model of a monopoly market of passenger rail 
services. The model contains an algorithm that approximates the equilibrium price and 
timetable of the operator. The efficiency of the algorithm is tested against the 
equilibrium price and timetable found analytically using the Salop model of circular 
city. The simulations show that the algorithm is efficient and that the efficiency of the 
algorithm depends negatively on the equilibrium number of trains in the market. 
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